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Abstract. We present a compositional method for deriving control constraints
on a network of interconnected, partially observable and partially controllable
plant components. The constraint derivation method works in conjunction with an
antichain–based, symbolic algorithm for computing weakest strategies in safety
games of imperfect information. We demonstrate how the technique allows a re-
active controller to be synthesized in an incremental manner, exploiting locality
and independence in the problem specification.
1 Introduction
Control Synthesis [23] is the idea of automatically synthesizing a controller for enforc-
ing some desired behaviour in a plant. This problem can be phrased logically as follows.
Given a plant description P and a desired property φ, construct a controller C such that
P‖C  φ. Control synthesis is a close cousin of the model checking problem. Where
model checking is about establishing whether or not a model supports a given property,
control synthesis is about generating a model on which the property will hold.
The main difficulty that any effective procedure for controller synthesis must face
is that the uncontrolled state space generated by the plant description is typically large.
This is mainly due to concurrency in the model, which is a central issue also in model
checking. However, for synthesis the problem is amplified by two additional, compli-
cating factors. First, we typically see a higher degree of non–determinism because a
priori no control constraints are given. Second, it is often the case that the state of the
plant P is only partially observable for the controller C. Resolving this may incur an-
other exponential blowup. On instances, this blowup may be avoided by using smart,
symbolic methods [26].
Contribution In this paper we focus on the compositional synthesis of a reactive con-
troller under the assumption of partial observability. Our main contributions are a com-
positional framework for describing control synthesis problems as a network of inter-
connected, partially controllable, partially observable plant components, and a compo-
sitional method for synthesizing safety controllers over such a plant model.
We believe there are at least two novel aspects to our approach. First, there is the
combination of imperfect information with compositionality. In particular, we make
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sure that context assumptions take into account partial observability of the components.
Second, our framework ensures context assumptions gradually shift in the direction of
control constraints as the scope widens. In this way we avoid, to some extent, unrealistic
assumptions, and generally obtain a less permissive context. Note that the size of the
context assumptions is an important factor [19] in the efficiency of assume–guarantee
based methods.
This work is complementary to our work in [13]. The game solving algorithm we
present there is designed to be applied in a compositional setting. It is an efficient coun-
terexample driven algorithm for computing sparse context assumptions. As such, it is
especially suitable for the higher levels in the composition hierarchy where abstraction
is often possible (and useful). However, its succesful application hinges on the fact that
control constraints local to any of the considered subcomponents should already be in-
corporated into the game board. Here we show how this can be achieved by proceeding
compositionally.
Related Work Synthesis of reactive systems was first considered by Church [10] who
suggested the problem of finding a set of restricted recursion equivalences mapping an
input signal to an output signal satisfying a given requirement [25]. The classical solu-
tions to Church’s Problem [4, 22] in principle solve the synthesis problem for omega–
regular specifications. Since then, much of the subsequent work has focussed on extend-
ing these results to richer classes of properties and systems, and on making synthesis
more scalable.
Pioneering work on synthesis of closed reactive systems [18, 11] uses a reduction
to the satisfiability of a temporal logic formula. That it is also possible to synthesize
open reactive systems is shown [20, 21] using a reduction to the satisfiability of a CTL∗
formula, where path operators force alternation between the system and the environ-
ment. Around the same time, another branch of work [23, 16] considers the synthesis
problem specifically in the context of control of discrete event systems, this introduces
many important control theoretical concepts, such as observability, controllability, and
the notion of a control hierarchy.
More recently several contributions have widened the scope of the field and at the
same time addressed several scalabilty issues. Symbolic methods, already proven suc-
cesful in a verification setting, can be applied also for synthesis [2]. Symbolic tech-
niques also enable synthesis for hybrid systems which incorporate continuous as well
as discrete behaviour [1]. Controller synthesis under partial information can be done by
a reduction to the emptyness of an alternating tree automaton [15]. This method is very
general and works in branching and linear settings. However, scalability issues remain
as the authors note that most of the combinatorial complexity is shifted to the empty-
ness check for the alternating tree automaton. In [14] a compositional synthesis method
is presented that reduces the synthesis problem to the emptyness of a non–deterministic
Bu¨chi tree automaton. For the specific case of hard real time systems the full expressive
power of omega regular languages may not be necessary [17], since a bounded response
requirement can be expressed as a safety property.
Even the earliest solutions to Church’s problem, essentially involve solving a game
between the environment and the control [24]. As such there is a need to study the (sym-
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bolic) representation and manipulation of games and strategies as first class citizens. In
[7] a symbolic algorithm for games with imperfect information is developed based on
fixed point iteration over antichains. In [5] there are efficient on–the–fly algorithms for
solving games of imperfect information.
Compositionality adds another dimension to the synthesis problem: in order to ob-
tain more scalable solutions it is desirable to solve the synthesis problem in an incre-
mental manner, treating first subproblems in isolation before combining their results. In
general this requires a form of assume–guarantee reasoning. There exists an important
line of related work that addresses such issues.
One such recent development that aims to deal with component based designs are
interface automata [12]. This work introduces interfaces as the weakest behavioural
assumptions/guarantees between components. A synchronous, bidirectional interface
model is presented in [6]. Our component model is similar, but differs on the in–/output
partition of the variables to be able to handle partially observable systems. Besides
providing a clean theory of important software engineering concepts like incremental
design and independent implementability, interfaces also have nice algorithmic prop-
erties allowing for instance automated refinement and compatibility checking. Several
algorithms for interface synthesis are discussed in [3].
Authors in [9] describe a co–synthesis method based on assume–guarantee rea-
soning. Their solution is interesting in that it addresses non–zero–sum games where
processes compete, but not at all cost. In [8] the same authors explore ways in which
to compute evironment assumptions for specifications involving liveness properties, re-
moval of unsafe transitions constitutes a pre–processing step. Note that, for a liveness
property, in general, there does not exist a unique weakest assumption on the context,
so this is a non–trivial problem.
Structure The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we build up a
game–theoretic, semantical framework for control synthesis problems. We also present
our running example used to illustrate all the definitions. In Section 3 we propose a
sound and complete compositional method for control synthesis. We demonstrate the
method on the running example. In Section 4 we conclude with a summary of the con-
tribution, and perspectives on future work.
2 Compositional Framework
In this section we give a formal semantics for our central object of interest, which is the
plant under control, or PuC. First we give an example.
A Motivating Example We consider the parcel plant illustrated in Figure 1. This
fictive plant consists of a feeder and two stamps connected together with a conveyor
belt. A parcel is fed onto the belt by the feeder. The belt transports the parcel over to
stamp 1 which prints a tracking code. The belt then transports the parcel over to stamp
2 which stamps the shipping company’s logo. Next to the illustration in Figure 1 we list
all the propositions we used to model this particular example. For each proposition we
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feeder
stamp 1 stamp 2
optical sensors
Model Propositions
prop.: description: cntrl.: here:
p0 parcel at 0 - true
s0 sensor 0 in true
p1 parcel at 1 - false
a1 arm 1 out false
s1 sensor 1 in false
p2 parcel at 2 - true
a2 arm 2 out true
s2 sensor 2 in true
feed0 stamp1 stamp2
p0 p1 p2
s0 a1 s1 a2 s2
Desired Control Logic
Model
Components
Fig. 1. A modular parcel stamping plant. (top left) The legend (top right) shows all the proposi-
tions we used to model this example. The decomposition structure (bottom) shows the compo-
nents we identified in the model and their interconnections, in terms of input and output proposi-
tions.
indicate whether it is a control output/input, and whether or not it holds for the current
state of the plant as it is shown in the picture. We specify the behaviour of the three
components in the parcel stamp using Kripke structures over these atomic propositions
in Figure 2.
Definition 1 (Kripke Structures) We let X be a background set of propositions. For a
given (finite) subset X ⊆ X of propositions we define S[X ] = 2X as the set of states,
or valuations overX . We define shorthand S = S[X ]. A Kripke structure is a tupleA =
(L,X, γ, δ, Linit), consisting of a set of locationsL, a finite set of relevant propositions
X ⊆ X , a propositional labeling γ : L→ S[X ], a transition relation δ ⊆ L×L, and a
set of initial locationsLinit ⊆ L. For any two Kripke structuresA1, A2 the composition
A12 = A1‖A2 is defined withL12 = {(ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ L1×L2 | γ1(ℓ1)∩X2 = γ2(ℓ2)∩X1},
X12 = X1 ∪ X2, for all (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ L12 it holds γ12(ℓ1, ℓ2) = γ1(ℓ1) ∪ γ2(ℓ2), for all
(ℓ1, ℓ2), (ℓ
′
1, ℓ
′
2) ∈ L12 it holds (ℓ1, ℓ2)δ12(ℓ′1, ℓ′2) iff ℓ1δ1ℓ′1 and ℓ2δ2ℓ′2, and, for the
initial locations, it holds Linit12 = (Linit1 × Linit2 ) ∩ L12. Note that L12 contains all the
pairs of locations in the Kripke structures that are consistent, meaning that they agree
on the truth of all shared propositions X1 ∩X2. ⊳
We note that, in our notation, we use a horizontal bar to denote the negation of
a proposition letter, i.e.: a1 should be read as not a1 which, in turn, is interpreted as
stamp number 1 has not activated its stamping arm. Next, we note that the models for
the stamps contain deadlock locations. We use this to encode a safety property into
the model. The safety property here simply says that the stamp must activate whenever
there is a parcel present on the belt, otherwise the system will deadlock.
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Fig. 2. Kripke structures modeling the feeder (left), stamp 1 (center), and stamp 2 (right).
Game Semantics We now turn to assigning a game semantics to the type of plant
models we have just introduced. We start with some prerequisites.
Definition 2 (Strategy) A strategy f : S∗ → 2S is a function mapping histories of
states to the sets of allowed successor states. With f⊤ we denote the strategy that maps
all histories to S. A trace σ = s0 . . . sn ∈ S+ is consistent with f iff for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n
it holds f(s0 . . . si−1) ∋ si. With Reach(f) we denote the set of traces consistent with
f . We require strategies to be prefix–closed meaning that f(σ) 6= ∅ and σ 6= ǫ implies
σ ∈ Reach(f). A strategy f is safe iff for all σ ∈ Reach(f) it holds f(σ) 6= ∅. With
Safe we denote the set of all safe strategies. ⊳
Any given Kripke structure can be viewed as a strategy by considering the restriction
that the Kripke structure places on the next state given the history of states that came
before.
Definition 3 (Regular Strategies) To a given Krikpke structure A, we assign the strat-
egy [[A]] : S∗ → 2S such that for the empty trace ǫ it holds s ∈ [[A]](ǫ) iff there exists
an initial location ℓ0 ∈ LinitA such that ℓ0 is consistent with s, and for a given history
σ = s0 . . . sn ∈ S
+ it holds s′ ∈ [[A]](σ) iff there exists a computation ℓ0 . . . ℓn+1 in
the Kripke structure such that ℓ0 ∈ LinitA , each location ℓi for i ≤ n is consistent with
si, and s′ is consistent with ℓn+1. A strategy f ∈ F is regular iff there exists a finite
Kripke structure A such that f = [[A]]. ⊳
It is often important that Kripke structures are input enabled for a subset of the
propositions X i ⊆ X as is the case for the Kripke structures we defined for the parcel
stamp. In practice this is easy to enforce using some syntactic criteria on the specifica-
tion. On a semantic level we prefer to abstract from the particular way the strategy is
represented. For this reason we introduce the notion of permissibility.
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Definition 4 (Permissibility) For a given set of propositions X ⊆ X we define the
indistinguishability relation ∼X⊆ S ×S such that s ∼X s′ iff s∩X = s′ ∩X , we lift
∼X to traces of states σ = s1 . . . sn ∈ S∗ and σ′ = s′1 . . . s′m ∈ S∗ such that σ ∼X σ′
iff n = m and for all 0 < i ≤ n it holds si ∼X s′i. A signature is a pair [X i → Xo]
such that X i ⊆finite X and Xo ⊆finite X , we let X io = X i ∪Xo. A strategy f ∈ F is
permissible for a signature [X i → Xo] iff for all σ, σ′ ∈ S∗ such that σ ∼Xio σ′ and
all s, s′ ∈ S such that s ∼Xo s′ we have s ∈ f(σ) iff s′ ∈ f(σ′). With F [X i → Xo]
we denote the set of strategies that are permissible for [X i → Xo]. ⊳
Note that, for any Kripke structure, it holds [[A]] ∈ F [XA → XA]. To illustrate, we
can now formalize a suitable notion of input enabledness for Kripke structures in terms
of permissibility. We say thatA is input enabled for a subset of the relevant propositions
X i ⊂ XA iff [[A]] ∈ F [X i → XA \X i].
Definition 5 (Lattice of Strategies) We fix a partial order ⊑ on the set of strategies
such that f ⊑ f ′ iff for all σ ∈ S∗ it holds f(σ) ⊆ f ′(σ) we say f ′ is more permissive
or weaker than f . The set of strategies ordered by permissiveness forms a complete
lattice. The join of a set of strategies F ⊆ F is denoted ⊔F and is defined as f ∈ F
such that for all σ ∈ S∗ it holds f(σ) = ∪f ′∈F f ′(σ). The meet is denoted ⊓F and is
defined dually. ⊳
We have now all the prerequisites to introduce the concept of a plant under control
or PuC. A PuC is a semantic object that encodes the behaviour of a system of interact-
ing plant components. In addition it also specifies a set of control localities which are
selected subsets of plant components that are of special interest because of their control
dependencies. For each such control locality the PuC encodes context assumptions and
control constraints. Later we will show how these assumptions and constraints can be
automatically derived by solving games.
Definition 6 (Plant under Control) A plant under control (PuC) M is a tuple
M = (P, {fp, [X
i
p → X
o
p ]}p∈P , C, {gK , hK}K∈C)
Consisting of a finite set of plant components P , for each plant component p ∈ P
the PuC represents the component behaviour as the strategy fp ∈ F [X ip → Xop ]. We
require for all p1, p2 ∈ P such that p1 6= p2 it holds X ip1 ∩ X
i
p2
= Xop1 ∩ X
o
p2
= ∅.
The PuC has a selected set of control localities C ⊆ 2P such that P ∈ C. For a
given control locality K ∈ C we define X iK = ∪p∈KX ip, and XoK = ∪p∈KXop , and
fK = ⊓p∈Kfp. We define the control signature [Xci → Xco] such thatXci = XoP \X iP
and Xco = X iP \XoP . For each control locality K ∈ C, the PuC represents the current
context assumptions as the strategy gK ∈ F [XoK \X iK → X iK \XoK ], and the current
control constraints as the strategy hK ∈ F [XoK ∩Xci → X iK ∩Xco]. ⊳
In this definition we are assuming a set of interacting plant components that com-
municate to each other and to the controller by means of their signature of input/output
propositions. If a proposition is both input and output to the same component we say
it is internal to the plant component. The definition ensures that no other plant compo-
nent may synchronize on such an internal proposition. We assume that all non–internal
6
propositions that are not used for synchronization among plant components are control
propositions (open plant output propositions are control input propositions, and open
plant input propositions are control output propositions).
Note that we are assuming a given set of control localities. This information should
be added to an existing componentized model of the plant. Either manually or by look-
ing for interesting clusters of plant components that have some mutual dependencies.
Such an automatic clustering approach has already been investigated for compostinal
verification in [19].
Example 1 (Parcel Stamp) We define a PuC Mparcel for the parcel stamp example.
We first fix the plant components Pparcel = {feed0, stamp1, stamp2}. Their signa-
tures are Xofeed0 = {p0, s0}, X
i
feed0
= ∅, Xostamp1 = {p1, s1}, X
i
stamp1
= {p0, a1},
Xostamp2 = {p2, s2}, X
i
stamp2
= {p1, a2, p2}, Note that we make p2 an internal vari-
able of stamp2 since it is not input to any other component, in this way the control sig-
nature becomes Xci = {s0, s1, s0} and Xco = {a1, a2}. The component behaviour is
given by the Kripke structures in Figure 2, ffeed0 = [[Afeed0 ]], and fstamp1 = [[Astamp1 ]],
and fstamp2 = [[Astamp2 ]]. We define the control localities
Cparcel = {{feed0}, {stamp1}, {stamp2},
{feed0, stamp1}, {stamp1, stamp2},
{feed0, stamp1, stamp2}}
The context assumptions gK and control guarantees hK for each locality K ∈ C are
initially set to the vacuous strategy gK = hK = f⊤. ⊳
Global Control Constraints For a given PuC M we are interested in computing the
weakest global control constraints hˆP such that fP ⊓ hˆP ∈ Safe. In principle this
can be done by viewing the PuC as a safety game of imperfect information where the
safety player may, at each turn, observe the value of the control input propositions and
determine the value of the control output propositions. In this way we obtain a game
graph that can be solved using conventional game solving algorithms. The result will
be the weakest strategy hˆP for the safety player.
Definition 7 (Weakest Safe Global Strategy) For a given PuCM we define the weak-
est safe global control constraints hˆP as follows
hˆP = ⊔{h ∈ F [X
ci → Xco] | fP ⊓ h ∈ Safe}
i.e. the weakest global control strategy that is sufficient to keep the system safe. ⊳
Computing hˆP directly by solving the global safety game does not scale very well
to larger systems. For this reason we want to proceed compositionally and start with
smaller control localities K ∈ C such that K ⊂ P before treating the plant P ∈ C
as a whole. As it turns out solving the local safety game over the control signature
[XoK ∩X
ci → X iK ∩X
co] will yield control constraints that are too strong in the sense
that not every possible safe control solution hP ∈ F [Xci → Xco] on the global level
will be preserved. In Example 2 we illustrate this phenomenon.
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Fig. 3. Partial game tree for Astamp1 , where the safety player is restricted to use the control
signature [Xostamp1 ∩X
ci → X istamp1 ∩X
co] = [{s1} → {a1}].
Example 2 (Overrestrictive Control) In Figure 3 we show a partial unravelling of the
game board Astamp1 into a game tree. The nodes in the game tree are partitioned into
nodes for the safety player shown as solid boxes and nodes for the reachability player
shown as dotted boxes. The nodes for the safety player are annotated with the knowledge
or information set that the safety player has given the observation history. The nodes
for the reachability player are labeled with the forcing sets which are all locations to
which there exists a trace that is consistent with the observation history and the control
output as chosen by the safety player. From a forcing set, the reachability player fixes
the control input by choosing one of the locations in the forcing set. Note that the
subset construction does not show the concrete successor locations. Rather it shows the
resulting information set for the safety player, which is the smallest set of locations that
are consistent with the input/output that has been exchanged.
As can be seen the safety player is forced, after 1 iteration, to always play a1. Mean-
ing that, she is always activating the stamp. She cannot, based on her observations, de-
termine for sure whether or not there is a parcel present. Note however, if we would
have taken also the feeder component Afeed0 into account, it would have been possible
for the safety player to deduce this information based on the sensor in the feeder. So the
strategy forAstamp1 that we got from solving this game does not respect the strategy for
Afeed1‖Astamp1 which activates only if the optical sensor in the feeder is triggered. ⊳
3 Compositional Synthesis Method
Our solution approach to the problems sketched in the previous section is based on an
over approximation of the allowable behaviour followed by an under approximation of
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Fig. 4. Partial game tree for Astamp1 , where the safety player is allowed to use the control signa-
ture [Xostamp1 \X
i
stamp1
→ X istamp1 ∩X
o
stamp1
] = [{s1,p1} → {p0, a1}].
the denyable behaviour. The soundness of our approach rests on the notion of conser-
vativity.
Definition 8 (Conservative Systems) A PuC is conservatively constrained iff for all
K ∈ C both the local assumptions gK and the local constraints hK are conservative,
meaning that fP ⊓ hˆP ⊑ gK and fP ⊓ hˆP ⊑ hK , i.e.: both the local assumptions
and the local constraints allow all the behaviour that would be allowed by the weakest
safe global control constraints. A system that is not conservatively constrained is over
constrained. ⊳
For a conservatively constrained PuC we may always take into account the existing
control constraints and context assumptions while computing new control constraint
or context assumptions. This unlocks possibilities that allows more efficient symbolic
game solving. For larger systems there may exist control localities that need highly
non–trivial context assumptions which require a lot of computation time and storage
space. This problem is sometimes referred to as the problem of assumption explosion.
To prevent this we rely on two mechanisms. The first is the fact that the signature
for the context assumptions gK tends to the signature for the control constraints hK as
K approaches P . Note that, at the highest level of composition, P , the signatures for
the control constraints and the context assumptions coincide. This means that context
assumptions become more and more like control constraints as we progress upward in
the decomposition hierarchyC. The second mechanism we rely on is a synergistic rela-
tion between context assumptions and control constraints. In particular, for conservative
systems, it is possible while computing weakest context assumptions for a control local-
ity K ∈ C to take into account the conservative control constraints of all lower control
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localities K ′ ⊂ K that have been previously computed. We refer to this as subordinate
control.
Definition 9 (Conservative Local Context Assumptions) For a given PuCM and con-
trol locality K ∈ C we define the subordinate localities K↓= {K ′ ∈ C | K ′ ⊂ K},
and the subordinate control hK↓ = ⊓K′∈K↓hK′ . Now WeakestContextK(M) = M ′
such that
g′K = ⊔{g
′ ∈ F [XoK \X
i
K → X
i
K \X
o
K ] | (fK ⊓ hK↓) ⊓ g
′ ∈ Safe}
and M ′ is equal to M otherwise. ⊳
Lemma 1 (WeakestContext) The operation WeakestContextK(·) on PuCs preserves
conservativity. ⊳
Proof Sketch We define gˆK = ⊓{g ∈ F [XoK \X iK → X iK \XoK ] | (fP ⊓ hˆP ) ⊑ g}.
For this context assumption we can prove that it is conservative and safe in the sense
that (fK ⊓ hK↓) ⊓ gˆK ∈ Safe, it follows, by Definition 9, that gˆK ⊑ g′K , hence g′K is
also conservative. 
Example 3 (Computing Conservative Local Context Assumptions) In Figure 4 we
show a partial unravelling of the game board Astamp1 into a game tree, this time for the
control signature [Xostamp1 \X
i
stamp1
→ X istamp1 \X
o
stamp1
] = [{s1, p1} → {a1, p0}].
When we solve this game and determine the weakest safe strategy we obtain the
strategy which, in modal logic notation, can be defined as follows: p0 → ©a1, i.e.:
when there is a parcel in the feeder the stamp must activate in the next state. This
regular strategy is shown in Figure 5 (left) encoded as a Kripke structure.
Note however, that this strategy relies on observation of p0 which is not in the
control signature. This means that this strategy encodes an assumption on the context,
rather than a guarantee on the control. Assumptions may or may not be realizable de-
pending on the rest of the plant. In this example, for this particular constraint, a control
is realizable because the feeder component indeed provides us with an observation s0
that allows the control to derive the status of p0 by causality. ⊳
To fully exploit the synergistic relationship between context assumptions and con-
trol constraints we need to obtain also control constraints on a local level. So far we have
shown (in Example 3) how local context assumptions can be computed, at the same time
we have shown (in Example 2) that the direct approach to computing local control guar-
antees breaks down because it may yield constraints that are not conservative. However,
as it turns out, it is possible to approximate conservative control constraints based on
conservative context assumptions. Intuitively, this is done by under approximating the
denyable behaviour.
Definition 10 (Conservative Local Control) For a given PuCM and a control locality
K ∈ C we define StrongestControlK(M) = M ′ such that
h′K = ⊓{h
′ ∈ F [XoK ∩X
ci → X iK ∩X
co] | (fK ⊓ hK↓) ⊓ gK ⊑ h
′}
and M ′ is equal to M otherwise. ⊳
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Fig. 5. Context assumptions for stamp1 component (left), the behaviour of the stamp1 compo-
nent in its idealized context (center), the special Kripke structure encoding the rules of the dual
deny game for the stamp1 component (right).
Lemma 2 (StrongestControl) The operation StrongestControlK(·) on PuCs preserves
conservativity. ⊳
Proof By conservativity of M it holds fP ⊓ hˆP ⊑ (fK ⊓ hK↓) ⊓ gK . By Definition 10
it holds (fK ⊓ hK↓) ⊓ gK ⊑ h′K . It follows fP ⊓ hˆP ⊑ h′K . 
Example 4 (Computing Strongest Local Control) We can effectively compute an ap-
proximate local control strategy by exploiting a natural duality that exists between al-
low strategies and deny strategies. Where allow strategies determine what is the set
of allowed control outputs based on the observation history, deny strategies work by
mapping an observation history to the set of denied control outputs, which is just the
complement of the allowed set. We can exploit this duality because the weakest conser-
vative deny strategy is the strongest conservative allow strategy.
The construction that turns an allow game into a deny game is then done as follows.
First we turn all the control outputs a1, a2 ∈ Xco into control inputs a1, a2 ∈ Xci
′
and
replace them with a fresh set of deny outputs va1 , va2 · · · ∈ Xco
′
. We add one special
control output r ∈ Xco′ which is called restrict. The rules of the game are as follows:
if the safety player plays r the next state is not restricted. And the plant in its idealized
context progresses normally. If the safety player plays r, restrict, we require that, in the
next state, at least one of the deny outputs va1 , va2 , . . . differs from the original control
outputs a1, a2 . . . as chosen by the plant in its idealized context. In this way the safety
player is forced to be conservative in the restriction that she puts since she can only
deny some sequence of control outputs whenever she is sure that the idealized context
will never allow this sequence.
We may construct the game board for this deny game by taking the composition of
the Kripke structures for the plant, the context strategy, and the rule that forces at least
one of the deny outputs to be distinct from the control output as chosen by the plant in its
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Fig. 6. Game tree for the deny game Astamp1‖Acontext1‖Adeny1 , over the control signature
[{a1, s1} → {r, va1}], here rva1 means restrict by denying a1, and r means unrestricted.
idealized context. For stamp1 this is Astamp1‖Acontext1‖Adeny1 . A partial unraveling
of the resulting game tree over this product game is shown in Figure 6. When we work
this out further we quickly see that, in this game, the safety player is always forced
to play r. This means she cannot put any restriction on the control outputs. Which, in
turn, means that the resulting control strategy (after projecting out r, and projecting the
temporary va1 back to a1) will be f⊤, i.e.: we cannot put any control constraints using
the control signature for this locality. ⊳
Compositional Controller Synthesis Algorithm We have now established all pre-
requisites to present Compositional Controller Synthesis Algorithm 1 (COCOS). The
Algorithm 1: COCOS (Compositional Control Synthesis)
Data: A PuC M = (P, {fp, [X ip → Xop ]}p∈P , C, {gK , hK}K∈C) such that for all
K ∈ C it holds gk = hK = f⊤
Result: A maximally permissive, safe control strategy for the given system of plant
components.
Visited ← ∅1
while P /∈ Visited do2
select some K ∈ C such that K /∈ Visited and K↓ ⊆ Visited3
M ← StrongestControlK(WeakestContextK(M))4
Visited ← Visited ∪ {K}5
return hP6
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algorithm starts with a PuC M that is initially unconstrained, that is: the context as-
sumptions and control constraints for each control locality are vacuous. The algorithm
then works by making a single bottom–up pass over the control localities. It will start at
the lowest localities (for which K↓ = ∅) progressing up to the highest control locality
P . For each locality the weakest local context assumptions are computed (simplified
using the subordinate control constraints) and subsequently the strongest local con-
trol constraints are computed (based on the weakest local control assumptions and the
subordinate control constraints). The while loop terminates when the highest control
locality P ∈ C has been visited. At this point it holds hP = hˆP .
Theorem 3 (Correctness) Algorithm 1 always terminates, and after termination it will
hold (fP ⊓ hP ) = (fP ⊓ hˆP ). ⊳
Proof Completeness follows from the fact that there are only a finite number of control
localities. Soundness follows from Lemmas 1 and 2, and the fact that for the highest
control locality P the signatures of the weakest context assumptions, the strongest con-
trol constraints and the global control constraints hˆP coincide. 
Example 5 (Compositional Controller Synthesis) In Figure 7 we show how COCOS
treats the PuC Mparcel as defined in Example 1. The plant components are shown as
gray boxes connected by horizontal arrows denoting the unchecked plant propositions.
The control localities are shown as white boxes connected to the plant components by
vertical arrows denoting the control propositions. Each control locality is labeled with
the weakest local context assumptions and the strongest local control constraints in
modal logic notation. Since the algorithm performs a single, bottom–up pass over the
control localities this picture represents the entire run.
For locality {feed0} we get two vacuous strategies. The reason is that the feeder
plant component does not contain any deadlocks. As such it needs no assumptions or
control constraints to function safely. Control locality {stamp1} has been treated more
extensively as the running example in the previous sections. It requires a single context
feed0 stamp1 stamp2
{feed0}, (⊤ | ⊤) {stamp1}, (p0 →©a1 | ⊤) {stamp2}, (p1 →©a2 | ⊤)
{feed0, stamp1}, (s0 →©a1 | s0 →©a1)
{stamp1, stamp2}, (p0 →©a1 ∧ s1 →©a2 | s1 →©a2)
{feed0, stamp1, stamp2}, (⊤ | s0 →©a1 ∧ s1 →©a2)
p0 p1 p2
a2 s2
a1 s1
s0
Fig. 7. PuC, Legend: (weakest local context assumptions | strongest local control guarantees).
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assumption saying that the arm will activate when there is a parcel queuing in the feeder.
As we have seen in the previous example we cannot enforce this assumption on a local
level, yet. The situation for {stamp2} is completely symmetrical. After treating the
lower localities COCOS proceeds with the intermediate two localities.
For locality {feed0, stamp1} new context assumptions are computed. This compu-
tation cannot yet benefit from subordinate control, since subordinate control is still vac-
uous. However, we do note that, since the signature of the context assumptions changes
non–monotonically, the results will be different this time. In particular the p0 proposi-
tion has become an internal plant proposition which is no longer visible to the context.
At the same time the feeder component has added the control input proposition s0.
This means that the weakest context assumption has changed from p0 → ©a1 into
s0 → ©a1. Intuitively, by restricting the context signature as much as we can (with-
out sacrificing conservativity) the context assumptions have shifted into the direction of
something that can be turned into a control constraint.
For locality {stamp1, stamp2} the situation is almost symmetrical except for the
fact that the assumption p0 → ©a1 on stamp1 still has to be made by the context.
Note that even though the weakest local context assumptions are over approximating
the allowable behaviour by assuming plant proposition p0 to be observable, COCOS is
still able to recover the constraint s1 → ©a2 which has a clear causal dependency on
this proposition p0.
Finally, we treat the topmost locality {feed0, stamp1, stamp2} = P . The weakest
context assumptions for this locality are vacuous, since subordinate control already en-
sures safety. In this case, the strongest control constraints are simply the conjunction of
the subordinate control constraints. Note that this is where compositionality really helps
us: computing the assumptions for higher control localities becomes much easier in the
presence of subordinate control, especially using a counterexample driven algorithm. In
this case subordinate control ensures that there are no unsafe transitions anymore at the
highest level of composition. ⊳
4 Conclusion
We have presented a semantical framework for compositional control synthesis prob-
lems. Based on the framework we have developed a compositional control synthesis
method that is sound and complete for computing most permissive safety controllers on
regular models under the assumption of partial observation. The novel aspects of the
method are:
1. The signature of the local context assumptions changes non–monotonically with
increasing scope, tending to the signature of local control constraints. In this way
we obtain more realistic assumptions as the scope widens.
2. The local control assumptions are simplified with respect to subordinate control. In
this way, we make it possible to efficiently apply a counterexample driven refine-
ment algorithm for finding the weakest context assumptions.
3. Subordinate control is approximated based on local context assumptions. In this
way, we enable a synergistic relationship between local context assumptions and
local control constraints.
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Output Confusion and Subordinate Control To simplify exposition in this paper we
explicitly forbid in– and output confusion among plant components. For some applica-
tions, such as circuit synthesis, it may be desirable to allow in– and output confusion.
For instance, because a single output signal is shared by two or more components, or
because a single component treats a signal as input or output depending on its internal
state. Note that, to accomodate this, we need to consider moves of the safety player as
sets of control outputs (allow sets) as opposed to concrete control outputs.
Consider for instance a plant component over a single proposition x that at even
clockcycles treats x as output by writing a random bit s2j(x) ∈ {0, 1} to the controller,
and at odd clockcycles treats x as input by reading s2j+1(x) ∈ {0, 1} back from the
controller. Next consider a safety invariant that requires: s2j+1(x) = s2j(x). The re-
sulting game cannot be won by the safety player if she needs to choose concrete outputs
for x at each cycle t, since at even clockcycles t = 2j she cannot predict what the com-
ponent is going to write as output. However if we consider moves as proper allow sets
this problem disappears. At even clockcycles the safety player may simply allow x to
vary freely by allowing x to be either high or low: h(s0 . . . s2j+1) = {x, x}, and at
odd clockcycles the safety player may restrict x depending on what she observed in the
previous state: h(s0 . . . s2j) = {x} in case s2j(x) = 1 or h(s0 . . . s2j) = {x} in case
s2j(x) = 0.
The algorithm in [13] already treats moves for the safety player as allow sets. This
facilitates abstraction for the higher levels in the control hierarchy. Note that, if we
require the safety player to choose concrete control outputs she has no choice but to
emulate all subordinate control that we incorporated in the game board. If she would
choose a concrete control ouput that is forbidden by subordinate control the system will
block. Such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of an incremental algorithm like
COCOS. Instead in our interpretation the safety player can safely allow a control output
that is forbidden by subordinate control. Intuitively we can see this as a form of output
confusion among a control locality and its subordinate control localities.
Future Work We are currently working on an implementation of the framework in
a prototype tool. For the operations that we defined here on a semantic level to be
implemented efficiently, we are using a symbolic representation of context assumptions
as antichains over info/allow pairs, and the dual representation for control constraints
as antichains over info/deny pairs.
For solving games we are using a combination of forward and backward methods.
The lower control localities can typically be handled by forward methods, which has
an advantage that only reachable states are considered. For the higher control localities,
where there is more room for abstraction, we switch to a backward counter example
driven algorithm like in [13]. In this way we fully exploit the subordinate control con-
straints.
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A Proofs
A.1 Sanity Lemmas
Lemma 4 (Joins and Meets Preserve Signatures) For a given F ⊆ F [X i → Xo], it
holds ⊔F ∈ F [X i → Xo] and ⊓F ∈ F [X i → Xo]. ⊳
Proof (Lemma 4) Let F ⊆ F [X i → Xo], f⊔ = ⊔F , and f⊓ = ⊓F . We need to show
that f⊔ ∈ F [X i → Xo] and f⊓ ∈ F [X i → Xo].
First, we prove f⊔ ∈ F [X i → Xo]. Assume, for contradiction, f⊔ /∈ F [X i → Xo].
By Definition 4 (Permissibility) it follows there exists σ, σ′ ∈ S∗ and s, s′ ∈ S such
that σ ∼Xio σ′, and, wlog, s ∈ f⊔(σ), and s′ /∈ f⊔(σ′). It follows by definition of f⊔
that there exists f ∈ F such that s ∈ f(σ) and for all f ′ ∈ F it holds s′ /∈ f ′(σ′) in
particular s′ /∈ f(σ′). But this would mean that f is not permissible for the signature
[X i → Xo] which establishes the required contradiction.
Next, we prove f⊓ ∈ F [X i → Xo]. Assume, for contradiction, f⊓ /∈ F [X i → Xo].
By Definition 4 (Permissibility) it follows there exists σ, σ′ ∈ S∗ and s, s′ ∈ S such
that σ ∼Xio σ′, and, wlog, s /∈ f⊓(σ), and s′ ∈ f⊓(σ′). It follows by definition of f⊓
that there exists f ∈ F such that s /∈ f(σ) and for all f ′ ∈ F it holds s′ ∈ f(σ′) in
particular s′ ∈ f(σ′). But this would mean that f is not permissible for the signature
[X i → Xo], which establishes the required contradiction. 
Lemma 5 (Joins Preserve Safety) For a given f ∈ F , a subset F ⊆ F , and gˆ =
⊔{g ∈ F | f ⊓ g ∈ Safe} it holds f ⊓ gˆ ∈ Safe. ⊳
Proof (Lemma 5) Let f ∈ F and gˆ = ⊔{g ∈ F | f ⊓ gˆ ∈ Safe}. Assume, for
contradiction, that f ⊓ gˆ /∈ Safe. It follows by Definition 2 (Safety) there must exist
σ⌢s′ ∈ Reach(f ⊓ gˆ) such that (f ⊓ gˆ)(σ⌢s′) = ∅. Then by Definition 2 (Consis-
tency) it must hold that (f ⊓ gˆ)(σ) ∋ s′. Hence, gˆ(σ) ∋ s′. It follows by definition
of gˆ that there exists g ∈ F such that f ⊓ g ∈ Safe and g(σ) ∋ s′. Then, again by
Definition 2 (Prefix–closedness) it follows σ⌢s′ ∈ Reach(f ⊓ g). But, because g ⊑ gˆ,
it follows (f ⊓ g)(σ⌢s′) = ∅, this would mean f ⊓ g /∈ Safe which establishes the
required contradiction. 
Lemma 6 The weakest safe global strategy hˆP , from Definition 7, is well–defined. ⊳
Proof (Lemma 6) First, we need that hˆP is of the right signature: hˆP ∈ F [Xci → Xco],
this is ensured by Lemma 4. Second, we need that hˆP is safe: fP ⊓ hˆP ∈ Safe, this is
ensured by Lemma 5. 
Lemma 7 The operation WeakestContextK(·), from Definition 9, is well–defined. ⊳
Proof (Lemma 7) This proof is completely analogous to the proof of Lemma 6. First,
we need that g′K is of the right signature: g′K ∈ F [X
po
K \ X
pi
K → X
pi
K \ X
po
K ], this is
ensured by Lemma 4. Second, we need that g′K is safe: fK ⊓ g′K ∈ Safe, this is ensured
by Lemma 5. 
Lemma 8 The operation StrongestControlK(·), from Definition 10, is well–defined.⊳
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Proof (Lemma 8) First, we need that h′K is of the right signature: h′K ∈ F [XpoK ∩
Xci → XpiK ∩X
co], this is ensured by Lemma 4. Second, we need that h′K is conserva-
tive: (fK ⊓ hˆK↓) ⊓ gK ⊑ h′K , this follows directly from the definition of the infimum
strategy. 
A.2 Preservation Lemma
For the preservation results we rely on the existence of infimum and supremum strate-
gies over given signatures. But this is a rather technical explanation. What intuitively
happens, is that we are conservatively following a strategy g ∈ F with a given signa-
ture [X i → Xo]. Conservatively following a strategy with a given signature sometimes
entails making an over approximation of the allowed successors in order not to exclude
possible behaviour of the underlying strategy.
Definition 11 (Follower Strategy) For a given strategy g ∈ F and a given signature
[X i → Xo] we define the follower strategy g[Xi→Xo] such that for all σ ∈ S∗ we have
g[Xi→Xo](σ) = {s ∈ S | ∃σ
′ ∈ S∗.σ ∼Xio σ
′ and ∃s′ ∈ g(σ′).s ∼Xo s′}
⊳
Lemma 9 For a given strategy g ∈ F and a given signature [X i → Xo] it holds
g[Xi→Xo] = ⊓{g
′ ∈ F [X i → Xo] | g ⊑ g′}, i.e.: the follower strategy is the infimum
strategy above g over the given signature. ⊳
Proof (Lemma 9) It is clear that g ⊑ g[Xi→Xo] and g[Xi→Xo] ∈ F [X i → Xo]. To
see that it is really the least upper bound let us assume some h ∈ F [X i → Xo] such
that g ⊑ h. Now we need to show that g[Xi→Xo] ⊑ h. So assume, for contradiction,
g[Xi→Xo] 6⊑ h. It follows there exists some σ ∈ S∗ such that g[Xi→Xo](σ) * h(σ). So,
wlog, assume s /∈ h(σ) and s ∈ g[Xi→Xo](σ). From the latter we obtain existence of an
alternative trace σ′ ∈ S∗ and an alternative successor s′ ∈ g(σ′) such that σ′ ∼Xio σ
and s′ ∼Xo s. Now by permissibility of h and our assumption that s /∈ h(σ) we obtain
that s′ /∈ h(σ′), since by assumption s′ ∈ g(σ′), it would follow that g 6⊑ h, which
establishes the required contradiction. 
We may now go back and work out the proof–sketch we have already given for
Lemma 1. We recall that the lemma says that the WeakestContextK(·) operation on
PuCs preserves conservativity.
Proof (Lemma 1) Let M be a conservatively constrained PuC. Let K ∈ C be some
control locality. Now for M ′ = WeakestContextK(M) we must show that M ′ is con-
servative. We recall that by definition the only difference between M ′ and M lies in the
strengthened context assumptions g′K ⊑ gK (cf. Definition 9). So for conservativity it
would suffice to prove fP ⊓ hˆP ⊑ g′K (cf. Definition 8).
The main proof idea is to turn the behaviour of the global system — consisting
of the global plant behaviour fP restricted by the weakest safe global control strategy
gˆP — into a context assumption gˆK for control locality K , by following the global
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system’s behaviour fP ⊓ gˆP with the context signature for locality K . We then show
that the assumptions that we constructed in this way are conservative: fP ⊓ hˆP ⊑
gˆK , and we show that they are safe: (fK ⊓ hK↓) ⊓ gˆK ∈ Safe. This suffices since
g′K , by Definition 9, is the weakest safe context assumption so, in particular, it will be
weaker than the constructed assumptions: gˆK ⊑ g′K , since these are conservative by
construction it will follow that g′K is conservative as well: fP ⊓ hˆP ⊑ g′K .
First, we introduce some shorthand for the context signature for control locality K ,
so let [XgiK → X
go
K ] = [X
po
K \ X
pi
K → X
pi
K \ X
po
K ]. Next, we construct the required
context assumptions for control locality K , as follows: gˆK = (fP ⊓ hˆP )[Xgi→Xgo].
By Lemma 9 we obtain fP ⊓ hˆP ⊑ gˆK . It remains to show (fK ⊓hK↓)⊓ gˆK ∈ Safe.
For this, we will first prove that (1) (fK ⊓ hK↓) ⊓ gˆK = (fK ⊓ gˆK), and then we will
prove that (2) fK ⊓ gˆK ∈ Safe.
For (1), it would suffice to show gˆK ⊑ hK↓. We will use the assumption that M
is conservative, and the fact that hK↓ ∈ F [XgiK → X
go
K ], i.e.: the signature for the
context assumptions is wider than the signature for the subordinate control constraints.
Now assume, for contradiction, gˆK 6⊑ hK↓ from this it would follow that there exists
some trace σ ∈ S∗ and some state s /∈ hK↓(σ) while s ∈ gˆK(σ). From the latter it
follows that there exists an alternative trace σ′ ∈ S∗ and an alternative successor state
s′ ∈ (fP ⊓ hˆP )(σ
′) such that σ′ ∼
X
gio
K
σ and s′ ∼Xgo
K
s. But then, by the fact that hK↓
is permissible for [Xgi → Xgo] and our assumption that s /∈ hK↓(σ) it would follow
that s′ /∈ hK↓(σ′), and this would imply that fP ⊓ hˆP 6⊑ hK↓, which in turn would
imply that hˆP 6⊑ hK↓, which contradicts our assumption that hK↓ is conservative.
For (2), assume, σ⌢s ∈ Reach(fK ⊓ gˆK). It follows there exists σ′ ∈ S∗ and
s′ ∈ (fP ⊓ hˆP )(σ
′) such that σ′ ∼Xgio σ and s′ ∼Xgo s. By Prefix–closedness this
implies σ′⌢s′ ∈ Reach(fP ⊓ hˆP ). We now construct a third trace σ′′⌢s′′ ∈ S∗ such
that for all i ≤ |σ′′| it holds σ′′i ∩X
pio
K = σi∩X
pio
K and σ′′i ∩X
pio
K = σ
′
i∩X
pio
K and s′′∩
XpioK = s∩X
pio
K and s′′∩X
pio
K = s
′∩X
pio
K , whereX
pio
K = X \X
pio
K i.e.: this third trace
σ′′⌢s′′ is consistent with σ on all plant in– and outputs of locality K and it is consistent
with σ′ on all other propositions. Moreover, since σ ∼Xgio σ′ and XpioK ⊆ X
pio
K ∪X
gio
K
it holds, in addition, for all i ≤ |σ′′| that σ′′i ∩X
pio
K
= σ′i ∩X
pio
K
, i.e.: σ′′ is consistent
with σ′ on all in– and outputs of locality K = P \K . And finally, since σ ∼Xgio σ′ and
XcioP ⊆ X
pio
K ∪X
gio
K it holds, in addition, σ′′i ∩XcioP = σ′i ∩XcioP , i.e.: σ′′ is consistent
with σ′ on all control in– and outputs. The latter proves that hˆP (σ′′) = hˆP (σ′). Now
note that fP = fK ⊓ fK , moreover fK ∈ F [X
pi
K → X
po
K ] and fK ∈ F [X
pi
K
→ XK ].
Hence, by permissibility, fK(σ′′) = fK(σ′) and fK(σ′′) = fK(σ′), these two facts
together prove fP (σ′′) = fP (σ′). Now note that for the successor state s′′ it holds
s′′ ∼Xpo
K
s′ and s′′ ∼Xpo
K
s′ and s′′ ∼Xco
P
s′. And, since s′ ∈ (fP ⊓ hˆP )(σ′), it follows
s′′ ∈ (fP ⊓ hˆP )(σ
′′). It follows, σ′′⌢s′′ ∈ Reach(fP ⊓ hˆP ). By safety of fP ⊓ hˆP this
implies fK(σ′′⌢s′′) ∩ hˆP (σ′′⌢s′′) 6= ∅. Now note that fK(σ′′⌢s′′) = fK(σ⌢s) and
gˆK(σ
′′⌢s′′) = gˆK(σ
⌢s) and, by definition, gˆK(σ′′⌢s′′) ⊇ hˆK(σ′′⌢s′′). It follows
fK(σ
′′⌢s′′) ∩ gˆK(σ
′′⌢s′′) 6= ∅. Hence, (fK ⊓ gˆK)(σ⌢s) 6= ∅. 
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